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CASE COMMENTS
Child Custody-INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE MAY BE CONSIDERED IN FRAM-
ING CUSTODY MODIFICATION ORDERS-Niles v. Niles, 299 So. 2d 162
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
Gloria Marion Niles received custody of her two minor children
in dissolution of marriage proceedings before the Circuit Court for
Hillsborough County. By means of a post-dissolution order the trial
court transferred custody of the children to Donald Milton Niles, the
natural father and appellee., The mother appealed the order, claiming
she had been denied custody of her children on the grounds of her
proposed interracial marriage to a black man.2 In Niles v. Niles the
Second District Court of Appeal found that the impending interracial
marriage had not been the sole reason for transferring custody from
appellant and affirmed. The court, adopting what has come to be re-
garded as the general rule,4 held that interracial marriage is one of
many relevant factors to be considered in a custody proceeding. 5 The
court then cited additional factors that rendered the mother an un-
suitable guardian: men had spent the night in appellant's apartment
when the children were present; 6 appellant had suffered from emotion-
al instability reflected by a nervous breakdown requiring hospitaliza-
tion;7 and the conduct of the children had changed for the worse in
recent months.8
1. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (1973) provides for orders concerning the care, custody
and support of minor children after final judgment in a dissolution of marriage pro-
ceeding.
2. Niles v. Niles, 299 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
3. Id.
4. See notes 26-29 and accompanying text infra.
5. 299 So. 2d at 162-63.
6. Id. at 162. Although appellant conceded two men had spent the night with her
occasionally, a dispute existed as to whether the children had been present during those
visits. See Brief for Appellant at 3, Brief for Appellee at 4, Niles v. Niles, 299 So. 2d
162 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974). Such visits would not disqualify the mother from
retaining custody unless they posed a threat to the children's welfare and upbringing.
Therefore the children's presence during those visits was a critical issue. See Smothers
v. Smothers, 281 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1973); note 50 infra.
7. 299 So. 2d at 162. Emotional or mental disorders of a parent that threaten, the
child's best interests are frequently at issue in custody decisions. See generally Annot.,
74 A.L.R.2d 1073 (1960). Custody transfers may be based on parental conduct
evidencing emotional instability. See Green v. Green, 254 So. 2d 860, 861 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (mother's spending habits, relationships with other men, and
suicide episodes evidenced emotional instability). The fact that a parent once suffered
disorders requiring psychiatric care or hospitalization is not dispositive of custody
issues, however; the central issue is whether the parent is currently suffering a dis-
order that threatens the child's welfare. Thus the Iowa Supreme Court has held:
Where the record does not bear out a finding that the mother of a small child
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As the court of appeal noted, the welfare of the child is of para-
mount concern in change-of-custody cases.9 At common law the father
had the superior right to custody,10 but later cases held that the wel-
fare of young children was usually best served by awarding custody
to the mother. 1 Today, although the Florida dissolution of marriage
is presently suffering from a mental disease, but does show she has been dis-
charged from treatment . . . with symptoms under remission for a reasonable
length of time, and shows no probability of a recurrence, the mother should
not be deprived of the care and custody of her child for that reason.
Vanden Heuvel v. Vanden Heuvel, 121 N.W.2d 216, 221 (Iowa 1963).
Florida courts have taken a similar view. In Butler v. Butler, 248 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1971), custody had been transferred from the mother, whose manic-de-
pressive illness had resulted in incidents which threatened physical injury to the
child. The appellate court affirmed the order, noting findings that such incidents
were likely to recur. Id. at 175. But the court also noted that the mother would be
privileged to seek a return of custody when her health was restored. Id. See also
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 66 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1953) (custody transferred to mother after
psychiatric care resulted in recovery from mental disorder).
The one-sentence discussion in Niles of the mother's mental health was unenlighten-
ing as to whether the mother was currently suffering from the disorder. The court
did not indicate the severity of the disorder, whether a recurrence was likely, or the
probable effect on the children of the mother's condition.
8. 299 So. 2d at 162. Cf. Brust v. Brust, 266 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1972). Though the Brust court cited a number of factors in affirming an award of
custody to the father, the Florida Supreme Court has indicated the crucial factor in
Brust was the mother's difficulty in disciplining her children. Anderson v. Anderson,
309 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1975).
9. 299 So. 2d at 162, citing Jayne v. Dennison, 284 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1973); Bolton v. Gordon, 201 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967). Accord,
Belford v. Belford, 32 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1947); Green v. Green, 188 So. 355 (Fla. 1939);
Frazier v. Frazier, 147 So. 464 (Fla. 1933). Cf. Anderson v. Anderson, 309 So. 2d 1 (Fla.
1975); FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2) (1973).
10. McCann v. Proskauer, 112 So. 621 (Fla. 1927).
11. See, e.g., Teel v. Sapp, 53 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1951); Stewart v. Stewart, 24 So. 2d
529 (Fla. 1946); Jones v. Jones, 23 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1945). The rationale of these cases
is that "[olther things being equal, . . . the mother of infants of tender years [is] best
fitted to bestow the motherly affection, care, companionship, and early training suited
to their needs." Fields v. Fields, 197 So. 530, 531 (Fla. 1940), citing Gayle v. Gayle,
125 So. 638, 639 (Ala. 1930). See also Green v. Green, 188 So. 355, 356 (Fla. 1939) ("Na-
ture has prepared a mother to bear and rear her young and to perform many services
for them and to give them many attentions for which the father is not equipped.");
Commonwealth ex rel. Edinger v. Edinger, 98 A.2d 172, 175-76 (Pa. 1953) (discussion
of importance of mother's care).
Courts have tended to accept without question the assumptions underlying the pre-
sumption favoring the mother. See, e.g., Potter v. Potter, 127 N.W.2d 320, 328 (Mich. 1964)
(Smith, J., dissenting) (rule is based on "reason and common experience"); Commonwealth
ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer, 299 A.2d 243, 245 (Pa. 1973) (rule supported by "wisdom of the
ages"). However, one commentator has found that the limited empirical data available
supports the presumption. Bradbrook, The Relevance of Psychological and Psychiatric
Studies to the Future Development of the Laws Governing the Settlement of Inter-
Parental Child Custody Disputes, 11 J. FAMILY L. 557, 586 (1971). One Florida court,
in affirming a custody award to the father, has expressly refused to consider nonjudicial
authority supporting the presumption. Brust v. Brust, 266 So. 2d 400, 402 (Fla. 1st Dist.
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statute requires that the father receive "the same consideration as
the mother in determining custody, ' ' 1 2 Florida custody decisions con-
tinue to hold that if other factors are equal the mother will be pre-
ferred.13
To support a change of custody order it must be shown that there
has been a significant change of circumstances since the original
order, and that failure to transfer custody will be detrimental to the
child.' 4 Stressing the broad discretion allowed the trial judge in making
custody determinations, 15 the Niles court found there was competent
substantial evidence of changed conditions to support the order. By
emphasizing non-racial factors and deferring to the discretion of the
Ct. App. 1972). The Brust case exemplifies the current trend towards erosion of the
presumption. See note 13 infra.
12. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2) (1973).
13. See, e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 309 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975) (decided after
Niles); Brandon v. Faulk, 287 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
The Anderson case expressly held that FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2) (1973) does not alter
the traditional preference for awarding custody to the mother. 309 So. 2d at 2, 3. But
Anderson indicates the preference carries less weight than it has in the past. Florida
courts once took the view that the presumption mandated an award of custody to the
mother unless she were shown to be an unfit parent. See, e.g., Teel v. Sapp, 53 So. 2d 635
(Fla. 1951); Stewart v. Stewart, 24 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1946). In Anderson, however, the
court affirmed an award of custody to the father despite a specific finding by the
trial court that both parents were fit. 309 So. 2d at 1-2. Cf. Brust v. Brust, 266 So. 2d
400, 401 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972). The Anderson court indicated that although the
mother was to be afforded the benefit of "the traditional rule for prime consideration"
the preference was not a conclusive presumption. 309 So. 2d at 3, citing Goodman v.
Goodman, 291 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974). The Anderson decision ap-
parently regarded the "continuing preference" as but one factor to be weighed in deter-
mining the child's best interest. 309 So. 2d at 3. Thus the trial court, in exercise of its
broad discretion, see note 15 infra, could award custody to the father despite the
preference and the court's finding that the mother was a fit parent.
14. Hutchins v. Hutchins, 220 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 229
So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1969). See also THE FLORIDA BAR, FLORIDA FAMILY LAW § 24.55 (2d ed.
1972); 1 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTI-NUPTIAL CONTRAcTs § 14, at 14-73
(1967). The Hutchins court noted that Florida law requires a greater showing in support
of a modification petition than that necessary for a custody order at the time of the
original divorce. The court indicated such a rule is necessary both to comply with res
judicata principles and to provide a stable environment for the affected children. 220
So. 2d at 439. Similarly, a chancellor has less discretion to modify a custody decree
than he has to enter it initially. See, e.g., Belford v. Belford, 32 So. 2d 312 (Fla.
1947); Nixon v. Nixon, 209 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
15. 299 So. 2d at 163, citing Johns v. Johns, 108 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1959). In his original decree, the chancellor is given broad discretion in determining
what custody arrangement will best serve the child's welfare. An original custody order
will not be modified unless a clear abuse of that discretion is shown. Anderson v.
Anderson, 309 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1975); Pacheco v. Pacheco, 246 So. 2d 778 (Fla.), appeal
dismissed, 404 U.S. 804 (1971); Evans v. Evans, 70 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 1954); Green v.
Green, 188 So. 355 (Fla. 1939). The chancellor has less discretion, however, in change-of-
custody proceedings. See note 14 supra.
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trial judge, the appellate court avoided the issue of the weight to be
given to racial factors."'
Although the Niles fact situation has not been considered in Florida
before,'17 it has been ruled on in other jurisdictions. In Murphy v.
Murphy,"' custody of a nine-year-old child had been given to the
natural mother after her divorce. Two years later she married a black
dentist. The natural father then obtained an order transferring custody
to him. Citing the fact that the mother had been excommunicated by
the Catholic Church and had made no provision for the child's religious
instruction,s the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut said it
could find no clear abuse of the trial judge's broad discretion and
affirmed. 20
Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court in Potter v. Potter21
affirmed a modification order granting custody to the natural father
in the home of the child's maternal grandparents after the mother
married a black surgeon. The majority opinion stressed that the mother
had removed the child from the state without court permission, that
16. The court of appeal noted that the circuit court counselor had recommended
that custody be transferred to the father because appellant had "chosen for herself,
and therefore for herself and the children, a life style unacceptable to the father of
the children and the society in which we live." 299 So. 2d at 162. The counselor's
evaluation of lifestyle may have referred to appellant's alleged immoral conduct rather
than her proposed marriage, although the natural father had lived with his second wife
before his remarriage. Brief for Appellant at 3, Niles v. Niles, 299 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1974). In any case, a parent's sexual relationships are relevant to custody de-
cisions only if they adversely affect the children's welfare. See note 59 infra. Whatever
the significance of the counselor's evaluation of the mother's lifestyle, the closing
comments of the trial judge suggest his evaluation of appellant's lifestyle-and the
children's best interest-turned primarily on the mother's interracial marriage:
Well, folks, it is not written in a case [how] to decide what . . . is best for the
children. Certainly, under the laws of this country, as . . . now interpreted by
the Court, inter-racial marriages are no longer against the law. I know of no
law, [n]or even . . . of any social circle, that represents it as desirable ....
Certainly, in our present way of thinking, inter-racial marriages are frowned
upon by most people of both races and certainly, without question children of an
inter-racial married family will be subjected to pressures and problems that
they should not be called upon to do. I find that the best interests of the
children will be determined by giving them to the custody of their father.
Brief for Appellant at 5, Niles v. Niles, 299 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
Under the general rule followed in other jurisdictions and apparently adopted in Niles,
a trial judge abuses his discretion if he regards the racial issue as the decisive
factor. See notes 24-29 and accompanying text infra.
17. The Niles issue would have been foreclosed in Florida prior to Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), by enforcement of an antimiscegenation statute. See FLA. STAT.
§ 741.11 (1965); notes 41-48 and accompanying text infra.
18. 124 A.2d 891 (Conn. 1956).
19. Id. at 893.
20. Id.
21. 127 N.W.2d 320 (Mich. 1964).
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'the mother was, in the eyes of the court, "a picture of a young woman
who has been in serious rebellion," and that her behavior did not
present "a picture of certainty and stability. " 22
In Murphy and Potter, the courts rejected claims that racial issues
had been significant considerations in framing the orders. 23 Like the
Niles court, the Murphy and Potter courts focused on nonracial factors
and the broad discretion of the trial judge. The Murphy and Potter
decisions thus left unresolved the propriety of considering racial issues
in reaching child custody decisions.
The issue was confronted, however, by an Illinois appellate court
in Fountaine v. Fountaine.24 In Fountaine, the white mother petitioned
the court to reverse an order giving custody of the children to the
natural father, a black man, following her divorce. The mother claimed
22. Id. at 325-26. The concurring opinion criticized the majority for applying a
"hypercritical 'fitness' test." Id. at 327 (Black, J., concurring). The dissenting opinion
vigorously objected to the majority's stress on the mother's failure to obey the trial
court's order to keep the child within the jurisdiction. The dissent noted that the
father had resorted to self-help to return the child to the jurisdiction, and that, in
any case, contempt of court does not deprive an otherwise fit parent of custody. Id. at
327 (Smith, J., dissenting). Cf. Teel v. Sapp, 53 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1951) (mother's false
statement in affidavit for service that father's address was unknown does not indicate
mother is unfit parent).
23. In Murphy the court said:
The plaintiff in her brief claims that the decision of the trial court was based
upon the fact that she had married a Negro. . . . [S]uch a consideration was not
included in those which led the court to the conclusion reached.
124 A.2d at 893. The Potter court stated:
[A]n attempt has been made by counsel for appellant to inject into the case
questions of civil rights . . . . It is obvious from the opinion of the circuit judge
that he did not consider such racial differences as of special significance at the
present time.
127 N.W.2d at 326. Though racial considerations may not have swayed the Murphy
trial judge, they seem to have permeated the case. The mother had retained custody
for two years with no complaint from the father. Within 12 days of her remarriage the
father filed for a modification order, alleging she had been excommunicated, had
failed to provide the daughter with religious instruction, and had alienated her parents
and thus deprived the child of loving grandparents. Both excommunication and parental
alienation resulted from the mother's remarriage. 124 A.2d at 893.
In Potter, the trial judge heard evidence on the racial issue, including a statement
from the psychiatrist-director of the Wayne County Children's Center that the mother's
multiracial California neighborhood would be a better environment for the child than
the grandparent's racially tense Detroit neighborhood. The expert witness also ex-
pressed concern about placing the child in the home of grandparents who were hostile
to the child's mother. He recommended that the child be returned to the mother.
MARRIAGE AcRoss T1HE COLOR LINE 70 (C. Larsson ed. 1965). The trial judge's opinion
noted that "one must accept the thesis of the expert . . . that if there are stable
inter-personal relations in the home of the mother and a favorable community
climate, the fact of a bi-racial marriage alone should not defeat the mother's claim."
Quoted in 127 N.W.2d at 328. See also note 35 and accompanying text infra.
24. 133 N.E.2d 532 (Ill. Ct. App. 1956).
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that the father had been given custody of the children solely because
of their appearance. The appellate court agreed that the trial court's
custody determination was based solely on the racial characteristics of
the children, and that such a decision was an abuse of discretion.25
The court held that, although relevant to a determination of the
child's best interests, "the question of race alone [cannot] overweigh
all other considerations and be decisive of the question. ' ' 26 This ap-
proach has come to be regarded as the general rule,27 and was apparent-
ly adopted by the Florida court in Niles. The Niles decision seemed
to assume that a resolution of custody based solely on the mother's
interracial marriage would be an abuse of discretion, 28 but that racial
issues could properly be considered with other relevant factors in
determining the child's best interests.2 9
The Fountaine and Niles cases reflect a judicial assumption that
an interracial environment is inherently detrimental to children; inter-
racial marriage is intrinsically relevant to custody determinations only
if it is thought that an interracial home will impede the child's best
interests. This assumption, like that which supports the preferred
position of the mother in custody determinations,3 0 rests on judicial
generalizations rather than on empirical data. Although courts once
gave free rein to their own racial prejudices in discussing interracial
homes,3 1 courts now tend to reason that, because our society has not
yet overcome racial prejudice, children raised in interracial homes
will inevitably be exposed to detrimental pressures.3 2
25. Id. at 534-35.
26. Id. at 535.
27. Comment, Race as a Consideration in Adoption and Custody Proceedings, 1969
U. ILL. L.F. 256, 257.
28. "From a study of the record we do not believe it can fairly be said that ap-
pellant lost her children solely because of her proposed interracial marriage." 299 So.
2d at 162.
29. "The effect of an interracial marriage upon a particular child is but one of
many factors which may be considered in determining in whose custody the child's
best interest would be served." Id. at 162-63.
30. See note 11 supra.
31. See, e.g., Ward v. Ward, 216 P.2d 755, 756 (Wash. 1950) ("These unfortunate
,girls, through no fault of their own, are the victims of a mixed marriage .... "); In re
Hunter, 193 P. 155, 156 (Cal. App. 1920) ("[M]arriage between a white girl and a
Hindu . . . is abhorent and unthinkable to every enlightened and right thinking
Caucasian.").
32. For instance, in Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer, 289 A.2d 202 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1972), rev'd, 299 A.2d 243 (Pa. 1973), the trial judge had stated:
[T]hough some in-roads are being made today, the almost universal prejudice
and intolerance of interracial marriage is real and undeniable. This bias, how-
ever silly and unreasonable, is also exhibited toward the children .[of interracial
marriages]; and it must be admitted the plight of these children .in .the .past has
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Empirical data concerning such homes is limited, and most of that
data involves adoption of black children by white parents rather than
custody in an interracial home which includes a natural parent. 3 But
the evidence available does not indicate interracial homelife is in-
herently harmful to children.3 4 Thus, the trial judge in Potter stated:
[There] is no legal authority that living in an interracial home
which is otherwise favorable is injurious to a minor child. We
have been exhibited no authoritative studies in the behavioral
sciences that indicate hurt or injury to a child in an interracial
home which is happy and stable.35
The lack of proof that interracial homes are detrimental to children
was a central factor in Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer.3 6
There the Pennsylvania Supreme Court directed the trial court to
award custody to the mother despite her interracial marriage. The
supreme court noted that "sociological studies establish that children
raised in [interracial homes] do not suffer from this circumstance,"
and that there had been no evidence of special circumstances indicating
that the children whose custody was at issue were likely to suffer from
not been a happy one and in our opinion, this ancient phobia merits consideration
in this case.
Quoted in 289 A.2d at 203 (Hoffman, J., dissenting). This reasoning is similar to that
of the Niles trial judge. See note 16 supra.
In Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972), a three-judge court
ruled that a Louisiana statute prohibiting interracial adoptions violated the equal
protection clause. The court stated:
Cognizant of the realities of American society, this Court would agree that an
interracial home in Louisiana presents difficulties for a child, including the possible
refusal by a community to accept the child, and other community pressures, born
of racial prejudice on the interracial family .... (W]e regard the difficulties in-
herent in interracial adoption as justifying consideration of race as a relevant
factor in adoption, and not as justifying race as the determinative factor.
Id. at 266. Cf. Comment, supra note 27, at 256-57: "The states are in unanimous agree-
ment that in adoption and custody proceedings, the welfare and best interest of the
child are paramount. Race has long been a factor considered by courts and agencies in
such proceedings; in light of the realities of American society it would seem to be a most
relevant consideration."
33. E. HERZOG, C. SUDIA, J. HARWOOD & C. NEWCOMB, FAMILIES FOR BLACK CHILDREN-
THE SEARCH FOR ADOP-IVE PARENTS 37, 41-42 (1971). Interracial adoption is usually
justified on the ground that it is more desirable for the child than remaining in an
institution, often the only alternative. Id. at 38. See Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F.
Supp. 264 (1972). The availability of this justification may inhibit investigation into
the effects on a child of interracial adoption.
34. MARRIAGE ACROSS THE COLOR LINE 68 (C. Larsson ed. 1965).
35. Quoted in id. at 71.
36. 299 A.2d 243 (Pa..1973)..
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living in an interracial home3 7 Therefore, the court held, there was
no compelling reason to depart from the strong presumption that a
young child's welfare will best be served by being placed in the
mother's custody.-18 The court concluded that if children are raised
in a "happy and stable home" they will learn to cope with prejudice
and will grow up unprejudiced themselves.3 9
Lucas seems to indicate that, at least in Pennsylvania, race is not
relevant to custody determinations absent specific evidence that the
particular children involved will suffer from life in an interracial
home. 40 The Lucas decision seems correct. The Fountaine assumption
that an interracial environment is harmful to a child is unjustified by
the data available. While the evidence does not conclusively show
there are no effects on a child in such circumstances, neither does it
show in any certain way that a child will be harmed. Moreover, it is
possible that being forcibly removed from his natural mother may
cause more harm to a young child than any stress created by social
prejudice as he grows older. Therefore any psychological pressures
that are merely assumed to result from an interracial home would seem
insufficient to overcome the favored position of the mother in custody
proceedings.
Though the Lucas case was decided on the basis of Pennsylvania
family law, the result in that case may be required by constitutional
considerations. In 1967 the United States Supreme Court in Loving
v. Virginia41 declared Virginia's antimiscegenation statute invalid under
the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Commonwealth of Virginia, assuming that the applicable
equal protection standard was the "rational basis" test,42 had argued
that the scientific evidence supporting the legislative classification was
in doubt and therefore the Court should defer to the legislature's
judgment.4 3 But, because the statute drew a classification based on
37. Id. at 245.
38. Id. at 246.
39. Id.
40. This was the position of a dissenting opinion in the court below. 289 A.2d
202, 207 (Hoffman, J., dissenting). Note, however, that the supreme court stated
the "basic reason" for the trial court's order was the interracial marriage. 299 A.2d
at 245. The Lucas case may thus be read as simply an illustration of the Fountaine
rule that race may not be a "decisive" factor in custody determinations.
41. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
42. The commonwealth had asserted that because the statute applied equal penalties
to blacks and whites, it did not constitute invidious racial discrimination, and hence
was to be judged under the more lenient equal protection standard. 388 U.S. at 7-8.
The Court rejected this argument on the authority of McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964). 388 U.S. at 10.
43. 388 U.S. at 8.
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race, the Court held a more stringent equal protection test was ap-
plicable. 44 The commonwealth was required to meet the "very heavy
burden"45 of showing the distinction made between interracial mar-
riages and other marriages was "necessary to the accomplishment of
some permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimina-
tion which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to
eliminate. '' 46 The Court concluded that the statute was invalid under
the equal protection clause because there was no "legitimate overrid-
ing purpose" which justified the classification.47 The Court further held
that deprivation of the fundamental right of marriage on "so un-
supportable a basis as the racial classification embodied in these
statutes" was a denial of liberty without due process of law.4 8
The Fountaine rule, like antimiscegenation statutes, is based on
a racial classification. Even though the Fountaine rule prohibits utiliz-
ing racial factors in a "determinative" fashion,49 the rule operates to
deprive parents of custody on the basis of their spouses' race. It thereby
singles out interracial marriages for special treatment. If no "legitimate
overriding purpose"-no compelling state interest 59-exists to support
this classification, the Loving case requires the conclusion that any
consideration of race in custody proceedings violates the equal protec-
tion clause.
Although at least one court has found the equal protection clause
flatly prohibits consideration of racial factors in custody decisions,51
44. Id. at 11.
45. Id. at 9.
46. Id. at 11.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 12.
49. See notes 24-27 and accompanying text supra.
50. In In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), the Court noted:
The state interest has been characterized as "overriding," [McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)]; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); "compelling,"
Graham v. Richardson, [403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971)]; "important," Dunn v. Blumn-
stein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972), or "substantial," ibid. We attribute no particular
significance to these variations in diction.
413 U.S. at 722 n.9.
51. In DeLander v. DeLander, 37 U.S.L.W. 2139 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 1968),
the father claimed that because his former wife had " 'an obsessive preoccupation'
with [black] associates," had taken a black husband and moved into a predominantly
black neighborhood, the minor children would be disoriented and unable to relate to
their own culture. Furthermore, he feared that in the event of race riots their lives
would be endangered. Id. The court responded:
The Fourteenth Amendment requires that a Court refuse to become a party to
any discrimination based on race. Thus any consideration of the stepfather's race,
or of the race of the mother's associations, or of the neighborhood racial mix,
would result in a Court making its determination on the basis of factors which
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits from consideration. If the Court modifies
[Vol. 3
CASE COMMENTS
such a result is not necessarily required. If protecting the interest
of children is considered a compelling state interest under parens
patriae2 the equal protection question remaining is whether the
Fountaine rule is necessary to further that interest. Like the assumed
perils of miscegenation at issue in Loving, the Fountaine assumption
that interracial homes are detrimental to children rests on either
equivocal scientific evidence or state officials' perceptions of social
"realities. ' '5 3 Neither equivocal empirical data nor judicial notice of
social conditions establishes the necessity of giving an interracial
environment special weight in custody proceedings. 54 Thus the equal
protection clause should bar courts from applying a rule which as-
sumes, in all cases, that interracial marriage will impede children's
best interests.
A different situation is presented, however, when it is clear from
the record that a specific child, in a specific interracial home, has
suffered racial abuse. Then the extent of the abuse, weighed against
other relevant factors, may make it necessary for the court to remove
the child from the interracial home to meet the compelling state in-
terest. To satisfy equal protection requirements, then, the rule should
be that an interracial environment is relevant to a change-of-custody
determination only to the extent that it has produced specific racial
abuse affecting the specific child.5
its prior custody order because of racial factors such a modification would be
a denial of the equality of all human beings.
The very act of considering race as a factor, and then disregarding it as a
controlling factor, requires that the State admit, contrary to the Constitution,
that there are differences in human beings because of their color.
Id. Cf. Stingley v. Wesch, 222 N.E.2d 505 (Ill. Ct. App. 1966) (holding, on other than
constitutional grounds, that stepfather's race has no significance in custody proceeding).
The DeLander court also noted that interracial marriages were not prohibited by
state law. 37 U.S.L.W. at 2139. Cf. Goldman v. Hicks, 1 So. 2d 18 (Ala. 1941). In Gold-
man, the father contended the gentile mother's subsequent marriage to a Jew rendered
her unfit to have custody of the child. The court held: "Marriages which are not
forbidden by statute, or violative of social morality, can have no such effect in this
State." Id. at 21.
52. Parens patriae, "parent of the country," refers to the guardianship power of the
state, as sovereign, over children. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
53. See notes 30-37 and accompanying text supra.
54. In Loving, the lack of scientific evidence militated against the existence of a
compelling state interest. In the context of child custody decisions, the question is
what judicial assumptions are. necessary to further the state's compelling interest. In
the latter situation, equivocal scientific evidence undercuts the necessity of assuming
interracial homes are detrimental to children, rather than the existence of the state
interest per se.
55. This is the rule suggested in a dissent to the superior court decision in Common-
wealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer, 289 A.2d 202, 207 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1972) (Hoffman, J.,
dissenting). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited the dissent with approval in reversing
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Such a rule would also satisfy due process requirements. The
Fountaine rule arguably interferes with fourteenth amendment liber-
ty to "marry, establish a home and bring up children,"56 since the
rule may discourage parents with custody of their children from
entering into interracial marriages, and may deprive parents who
have already entered into such marriages of custody. The classification
drawn by the Fountaine rule rests on considerations strikingly similar
to Loving, and therefore seems "so unsupportable" that it constitutes
a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. If the Fountaine
rule were limited to situations in which actual racial abuse had been
shown, the classification drawn between interracial homes and other
homes would seem sufficiently supportable to withstand due process
attack.
The Florida court's decision in Niles contains the seed of such a
modified rule. The Niles court stated: "The effect of an interracial
marriage upon a particular child is but one of many factors which
may be considered in determining the person in whose custody the
child's best interest would be served."57 The Niles court did not apply
this language stringently; it affirmed the findings of a trial judge who
gave considerable weight to an assumption that children generally
will be subjected to disruptive social pressures in an interracial home. 8
But the Niles language, if strictly construed, could lead to the
conclusion that interracial marriage is relevant in change-of-custody
cases only to the extent it produces demonstrable, rather than con-
jectural, detriment to a particular child's well-being. Such a rule
would comport with the changing Florida treatment of other factors
relevant to change-of-custody decisions,59 and would better serve the
ultimate end of protecting the child's best interests.
the superior court. 299 A.2d 243, 245-46. Although the supreme court apparently
applied the rule proposed by the dissent below, see 299 A.2d at 245, it did not refer to
or rely upon the dissent's careful analysis of the constitutional issues involved.
56. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
57. 299 So. 2d at 162-63.
58. See note 16 supra.
59. At least two aspects of Florida custody law indicate a growing tendency to
downplay generalized presumptions and to focus instead on the specific factors affecting
particular children. First, Florida courts have relaxed the rule that an otherwise fit
mother is to receive preferential treatment in custody decisions. See note 13 supra. This
relaxation reflects changing concepts of parental roles, and gives the trial judge addition-
al flexibility, allowing him to evaluate the best interests of the child in light of parent-
child relationships in individual families.
Second, Florida has taken a view towards parental morality that focuses squarely
on the child rather than on the parent. Moral unfitness has long been a basis for
depriving a parent of custody. See Teel v. Sapp, 53 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1951). But in
Smothers v. Smothers, 281 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1973), the Florida Supreme Court stated
that it would be error to transfer custody from a mother solely because of her illicit
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Courts following the Fountaine rule, recognizing the prejudice that
exists in American society, have treated race as a relevant factor in
custody proceedings in order to spare children the harmful effects
assumed a priori to result from such prejudice. But it has been clear
since Brown v. Board of Education"5 that the existence of prejudice
does not compel courts to allow discrimination to follow in its wake.
"Is it good public policy . . . to require people who have no pre-
judices to conform to the standards of the prejudiced? ... [I]s it wise
to require the socially healthy to keep step with the socially ill?"61
The answer must be no.
C. ANTHONY CLEVELAND
Constitutional Law-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-STUDENTS FACING
SUSPENSION HAVE PROPERTY AND LIBERTY INTERESTS THAT QUALIFY
FOR DUE PROCESS PROTECTION.-Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
During February and March of 1971 there was widespread student
unrest in the Columbus, Ohio, public school system. Many students
were summarily suspended for periods of up to 10 days pursuant to
applicable Ohio law., Dwight Lopez, a student at Central High School,
sexual activity, since such activity "may have no bearing whatsoever on the welfare
and upbringing of the children." Id. at 360. Although the Smothers court upheld the
modification order, it did so because the mother's personal relationships had led to
the continued presence in the home of a man to whom the children were unrelated
by law or blood. The supreme court noted that the man's nearly permanent presence
in the house, the fact that he physically disciplined the children, and his temperamental
outbursts during the natural father's visits supported the trial court's conclusion that
the mother's personal relationship with this man-rather than her sex life with him-
was detrimental to the children. Id.
60. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
61. MARRIAGE AcRoss THE COLOR LINE 73 (C. Larsson ed. 1965).
1. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.66 (1972) provides in relevant part:
The superintendent of schools . . .or the principal of a public school may suspend
a pupil from school for not more than ten days. Such superintendent . . .
or principal shall within twenty-four hours after the time of expulsion or sus-
pension, notify the parent or guardian of the child, and the clerk of the board
of education in writing of such expulsion or suspension including the reasons
therefor. The pupil or the parent, or guardian, or custodian of a pupil so
expelled may appeal such action to the board of education . . . and shall be
permitted to be heard against the expulsion. At the request of the pupil, or
his parent, guardian, custodian, or attorney, the board may hold the hearing
in executive session but may act upon the expulsion only at a public meeting.
The board may, by a majority vote of its full membership, reinstate such pupil.
No pupil shall be suspended or expelled from any school beyond the current
semester.
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